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This paper investigates patterns and determinants of temporary labour migration in 
Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine after EU enlargement in 2004. 
Migration incidence, destination choices and migration determinants differ between 
poorer and better-off countries. Although broadly in line with general results from the 
migration literature, we observe some peculiarities like the high share of older migrants 
and a modest role of family obligations in the migration decision process. We find no 
indication of a brain drain related to temporary migration in sending regions as the 
educational background of migrants is rather low. Migration is used as household 
insurance against unemployment and is associated with lower incidence of poverty. 
This finding remains robust when attempting to reduce the potential omitted variable 
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Introduction 
Economic migration from countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
to the European Union (EU) have considerably increased in recent years. Nevertheless, 
there is only little sound research on the quantity, destinations and determinants of these 
movements. Official statistics on the outflow of people from former Soviet Union 
countries are typically scarce and sometimes misleading
1, while individual data on the 
base of survey results are limited to single-country studies. An assessment of economic 
migration in this region is exacerbated by the fact that a great part of these movements 
is temporary and irregular. 
This paper takes advantage of a unique cross-country survey on recent migration 
movements which has been conducted with comparable survey methodology in Arme-
nia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. It is the first thorough analysis of migration 
patterns in this post-Soviet region. Because interviews were conducted in the sending 
countries, the data cover persons who have returned after migrating abroad for a certain 
period of time, i.e. temporary migrants. The strength of the survey is the inclusion of 
irregular migrants, as migrants were interviewed independent of whether they legally 
crossed the border and found a job in the receiving country. Using the results of this 
comprehensive survey, we analyse patterns and determinants of temporary movements 
in the Eastern European borderlands of the enlarged EU as well as the impact of migra-
tion on household welfare. It is of particular concern for this research to investigate 
whether standard results from the migration literature can be identified in the post-
Soviet context. 
Our main findings are the following: Across sending countries, temporary migration 
incidence differs considerably. While Moldova faced a high temporary labour emigra-
tion since 2004, Armenia, Belarus and Ukraine were confronted with a more moderate 
outflow. To the contrast, temporary labour movements from Georgia were quite low. 
With respect to destination regions, Russia and other CIS countries attracted the major-
ity of temporary migrants from Armenia, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, while Geor-
gian labour migrants headed predominantly for European and overseas destinations. 
Migration determinants are broadly in line with expectations from the economic migra-
tion literature in low income countries. However, we disentangle some peculiarities 
such as a back-loaded inverse U-shaped association between age and migration propen-
sity, a negative impact of university education and a rather low influence of family ob-
ligations on migration decisions. Migration is a household strategy to overcome unem-
ployment, however, households in the poorest regions cannot afford this insurance tool. 
Generally, we find a negative association of migration and current poverty. Although 
our choices are limited, we apply several tests to show that the poverty reducing effect 
of migration is not merely driven by reverse causation. 
 
1 Some country statistics only consider migrants who de-register officially, other sources like the United 
Nations Population Division data base use nationality based definitions of stocks of migrants which are 
inappropriate to investigate migration flows. OSTEUROPA-INSTITUT REGENSBURG, Working Paper Nr.273 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we give the aim and 
motivation for the study of migration determinants in the Eastern European borderlands. 
Section 3 provides an overview of the five countries under consideration which have 
made some similar transition experiences but also differ especially in economic devel-
opment and the political sphere. While Section 4 presents the conceptual approach to 
model the determinants of temporary migration decisions, Section 5 introduces the new 
survey data set. In Section 6 a descriptive analysis of migration patterns across coun-
tries is given. Section 7 illustrates the methodology, the econometric approach and the 
estimation results of migration determinants. This allows us to conclude in Section 8 
with some relevant policy implications for both, migrant sending and receiving coun-
tries. 
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1 Aim and motivation 
With the political and economic transformation in Eastern Europe following the break-
up of the Soviet Union, regional and international emigration barriers collapsed allow-
ing an increasing number of people to leave their home countries temporarily or perma-
nently. The destinations of these migrations varied widely: successor states of the So-
viet Union were addressed as well as European countries and other destinations in the 
Western world such as the USA, Canada or Israel. The vast array of migration types 
ranged from ethnically motivated movements to temporary labour migration. While 
ethnic return migration prevailed in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
labour migration was increasingly observed across the region in recent years (IOM 
2005, Mansoor and Quillin 2006). 
The EU enlargement in 2004 established a new dividing line in Eastern Europe, 
separating the successor states of the Soviet Union from their former Central European 
allies, which now belonged to the European Union.
2 Because of living standard differ-
entials, old and new European Union member states became targets of an increasing 
migration pressure from CIS countries either directly bordering the enlarged EU 
(Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus) or being close to its borders (Armenia, Georgia). As EU 
countries provided little space for the legal admission of labour migrants from CIS 
countries, temporary and irregular movements became widespread (IOM 2005, IOM 
2008). 
Inside the European Union, the reaction towards an increasing migration from the 
new Eastern borderlands countries was mixed. Whereas the introduction of a regulated 
temporary labour migration scheme from non-member states has recently been debated 
in the light of aging societies and the skill mismatch in labour markets (Brücker 2007, 
Hönekopp and Mattila 2008), there exists an unmistakable political and societal opposi-
tion against new labour movements from the East. In sending regions, labour emigra-
tions were seen with both social concerns and economic hopes. While the outflow of 
skilled and young people was opposed because of a potential brain and youth drain, the 
receipt of remittances was considered rewarding for the respective economies (Danzer 
and Handrich 2007). 
Against the background of new migration challenges in the post-Soviet space, this 
paper compares patterns of temporary labour movements and explores their determi-
nants in five successor states of the USSR, i.e. Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and 
Ukraine. Furthermore, we explore the poverty reducing effect of migration and address 
the problem of endogenous migration choice. It is the aim of this study to provide novel 
insights into the factors that characterize and shape temporary migration movements in 
the region after the enlargement of the European Union. 
 
 
                                                 
2 To cross the border towards EU countries, citizens from post-Soviet states required a travel visa since 
2003, a costly and time consuming obligation. 
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2 Countries under consideration: stylized facts 
The countries of our study—Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine—were 
all part of the Soviet Union, thus sharing common economic and political experiences 
and common transition challenges after the break-up of the Soviet Union. Although all 
of these countries went through specific migration episodes after becoming independ-
ent, some common patterns exist. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union triggered the 
return of ethnic sub-populations to their (former) ethno-national homelands, migrations 
in the initial post-Soviet era were predominantly of an ethnic character (Brubaker 
1998). While ethnic Russians who had lived in Armenia, Belarus, Moldova or Ukraine 
moved back to the Russian Federation, Armenians, Belarussians, Moldavians or 
Ukrainians who had settled (or were forced to settle) in other Soviet Union republics 
returned to their newly independent nation states (Ivakhnyuk 2006). These return 
movements were partly supported by the political uncertainty involved in the establish-
ment of new nation states
3 and a number of post-Soviet states also experienced consid-
erable emigrations because of ethno-political conflicts and ecological catastrophes. In 
Georgia for example political unrest and ethnic clashes in South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
triggered huge emigrations. The 1988 earth quake in Armenia resulted in an outflow of 
citizens, while ethnic tensions with the Azerbaijani minority forced many Azerbaijani to 
leave Armenia (Yeganyan 2006). The majority of movements in the post Soviet period 
were directed towards neighbouring states formerly belonging to the USSR. Between 
1990 and 2006 approximately 80% of emigrants from former Soviet Union countries 
moved within the CIS region, predominantly towards Russia (Mansoor and Quillin 
2006: 3). 
According to official data Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and Georgia experienced re-
markable net emigrations between 1991 and 2006 (see Figure 1).
4 Migration losses in 
this period ranged from 1.2% of the population (561 thousand people) in Ukraine to 
23% of the population (1 million people) in Georgia. To the contrast, net immigration 
prevailed in Belarus, most likely reflecting the comparatively stable economic situation 
and a politically rather closed country. 
Overall, official migration data indicate a decrease of migration activities in the new 
East European borderlands since the middle of the 1990ies, pointing to progressing eth-
nic unmixing within the CIS countries. In this period, migration movements in the re-
gion underwent two remarkable changes: economically motivated movements gained in 
weight and the share of people leaving for Western destinations increased (Mansoor and 
Quillin 2006:5, Malynovska 2006). While the USA, Germany and Israel had been the 
most important Western destinations in the initial migration period after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, the recent destination choice expanded to an increasing number of 
Western countries and among them countries like Italy and Spain, which had little im-
migration experience before the 1990s. 
                                                 
3 People of a minority nationality often turned home even when being born outside their titular country. 
4 It has to be noted that the quality of official data can be questioned at least in the early years after the 
break-down of the FSU. 
  4 Temporary Labour Migration and Welfare at the New European Fringe 
Despite the fact that net migrations in the five countries followed a decreasing trend 
since the end of the 1990ies when referring to official data (Figure 1), empirical obser-
vations point to the fact, that Russia as well as a number of European Union states faced 
an increasing (temporary) labour immigration from Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia dur-
ing that period (OECD 2006: 384-394). This inconsistency is due to the fact that only 
persons who receive an official permission to reside abroad (Ukraine) or those who dis-
pense their residence permits (Moldova, Georgia) are officially registered as emigrants 
in these states. Citizens of post-Soviet countries who leave on the base of family visits 
and tourist visa, who participate in bilateral agreements for temporary work or in a stu-
dent exchange program are not counted in official emigration statistics. Besides, illegal 
border crossing or visa overstaying add to an increasing number of citizens from post-
Soviet states, who live and work abroad. In the early 2000s, between 3.5 and 4.2 million 
legal and illegal migrant workers were estimated to have temporarily left Armenia, 
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, 60% of them with the destination Russia (Ivakhnyuk 
2006). 
In the light of economic reasoning, the growing economic migration in the new 
European borderlands should reflect disparities in income, wealth and quality of life 
between sending and receiving regions. Indeed, substantial differences in living stan-
dards can be observed when comparing the GDP per capita in Belarus, Ukraine, 
Moldova, Georgia and Armenia with corresponding data from Russia and a selection of 
EU countries (Table 1). Furthermore, the human development index (HDI), which por-
trays a country’s average achievements in three basic aspects of human development 
(health, knowledge, and a decent standard of living) demonstrates a noticeably higher HDI 
rank of European Union members as compared to Belarus, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia 
and Moldova (Table 2). Although Russia is ahead of Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and 
Ukraine in terms of HDI, it ranks below Belarus. Despite a certain economic recovery in 
recent years, poverty is still widespread in the countries under consideration. In Arme-
nia, the share of the population living in poverty, i.e. below US$2 per person and day, 
amounted to 31.1%, in Georgia to 25.3% and in Moldova to 29.1%. To the contrast, 
only 4.9% of the population in Ukraine were poor according to this definition, and less 
than 2% of the population experienced poverty in Belarus (EBRD 2007).
5 
Next to economic disparities that support the growing dynamics of economically mo-
tivated migration in the European borderlands, former contacts within the Warsaw pact, 
ethnic affiliations across borders, linguistic ties with Russia and specific migration tra-
ditions in connection with former ethnic return movements, are of relevance. All coun-
tries under consideration here were structurally interwoven with Russia in Soviet 
times—through ethnic minority relations as well as through a common educational sys-
tem, a common military service and a governmentally regulated labour allocation across 
Union Republics. However, the recent foreign relations to Russia were characterized by 
a number of severe conflicts, particularly in the case of Georgia and Ukraine. 
                                                 
5 The poverty headcount ratio is defined according to the World Bank definition by the share of the popu-
lation living on less than US$2 per person and day (in 1993 US$ at purchasing power parity). The data 
refer to 2002 (Belarus), 2003 (Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine) and 2005 (Moldova). 
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3 Determinants of temporary migration movements: conceptual 
approach 
One of the most influential theoretical approaches to explain the determinants of indi-
vidual migration decisions relates to cost-benefit considerations in the framework of 
neoclassical economics (Sjaastad 1962, Harris and Todaro 1970).
6 In line with this con-
cept, people move permanently if the discounted value of expected lifetime earnings - 
reduced by migration related expenditures - is bigger in the destination than in the home 
country. On the side of migration costs, all kinds of expenses associated with moving 
abroad have to be taken into account including psychological costs of leaving family 
and friends behind. Within this permanent migration framework, temporary labour 
movements would only occur if the migration decision turns out to be a failure, i.e. ex-
pectations with respect to future net benefits do not materialize (Duleep 1994, Cassarino 
2004). 
An increasing body of literature has challenged the concept of lifetime income 
maximizing individuals as drivers of labour movements, particularly in a context where 
migration barriers and market failures exist (Stark and Taylor 1991). The most promi-
nent strand of this literature, the new economics of labour migration argued that migra-
tion decisions are predominantly made by families, not by individuals. Market failures 
(e.g. in insurance markets) and economic shocks at home are seen as initial push factors 
in explaining labour migration (Stark and Taylor 1991). Accordingly, economic move-
ments are interpreted as a portfolio strategy to diversify household incomes in an envi-
ronment where capital, insurance and labour markets are not functioning properly. Fam-
ily members move abroad, to alleviate deprivation, to protect the family against poverty 
or to finance education, health care and entrepreneurial activities. In this context, the 
argument has been made that costs and risks of moving may not allow the most de-
prived households to participate in migrations (IOM 2005: 253). While the theoretical 
discussion on the nexus between poverty and migration is still under way, empirical 
observations find poverty among the root causes for movements, although the extremely 
poor are least likely to move from deprived regions (IOM 2005: 254). 
Within the framework of the new economics of labor migration—to which this re-
search highly relates—, migrants primarily target a specific income and return after-
wards. In contrast to neoclassical theory, the new economics of labour migration has 
started to implicitly consider short-term or repeated migration, although attempts to 
clearly distinguish both types of international movements are quite recent and plagued 
by conceptual difficulties as international movements become increasingly diverse with 
respect to motivation, destination and duration patterns (Khoo, Hugo and McDonald, 
2008). 
In analysing the determinants of temporary labour movements, the new economics of 
labour migration explains migration decisions by human capital and household related 
variables, such as age, gender, education, work experience, household size and family 
                                                 
6 For a comprehensive survey on migration theories see Bauer and Zimmermann (1998) and Massey et al. 
(1998). 
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structure rather than expected earnings (Mora and Taylor 2005). This allows formulat-
ing a number of testable hypotheses. Although younger persons would in general be 
more likely to migrate, as they have less invested in home country specific human capi-
tal compared to older age cohorts thus being less risk averse and more inclined to leave, 
the temporary character of movements would also allow older persons to move abroad.
7 
Compared to men, women are expected to have lower migration intentions, as they are 
typically more attached to their children and dependent relatives at home, particularly in 
more traditional societies (Boyd and Grieco 2004). Furthermore, education, work ex-
perience, language and other labour related skills as well as the transferability of these 
forms of human capital to the receiving economy are expected to be essential factors in 
migration decisions (Hatton and Williamson 2005). It is often assumed that higher 
skilled individuals have a greater motivation to go abroad, as they may face better em-
ployment opportunities and generally tend to have lower migration costs due to more 
effective and efficient search strategies for transportation, housing and foreign employ-
ment. In this context it is crucial whether education and skills acquired at home pay off 
in labour markets abroad. If sending and receiving countries differ with respect to the 
level of economic development, the educational system or social institutions, human 
capital transferability may be severely hampered. Moreover it has to be considered that 
under certain conditions only low-skilled segments of labour markets in receiving 
economies are open to immigrants, making migration less attractive for the highly-
skilled as they cannot transfer their human capital (Stark and Taylor 1991). With respect 
to household characteristics, bigger families and households with small children might 
participate less in labour migration as caring for small children usually constrains par-
ents in moving abroad. On the other hand, the responsibility for a big household with 
many dependents might likewise encourage labour movements in order to reduce eco-
nomic pressure at home, especially if labour migration is expected to be temporary. 
As all states under consideration here experienced economic and social transitions 
after the breakup of the Soviet Union, resulting in growing poverty, job losses, increas-
ing social inequality, a breakdown of social security systems and market failures, tem-
porary labour migration in the region is considered a strategy of families and individu-
als to cope with the obstacles of transition societies. 
 
                                                 
7 In the case of permanent migration, younger individuals face higher discounted accumulated lifetime 
earnings and thus are more likely to migrate abroad. 
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4 Data and variables 
In our empirical analysis we use survey data from Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova 
and Ukraine which has been collected in a multi-stage sampling framework by the EU 
INTAS project in the first months of 2006.
8 Based on pre-existing research, two regions 
with substantial rates of out-migration were selected in each country (except for 
Moldova where households were chosen throughout the country) to question approxi-
mately 400 household, summing up to 2,003 households and 8,166 individuals in the 
survey.
9 Households were sampled using multi-stage random selection in combination 
with a random routing method. The samples can be considered representative for sub-
regions or migration-intensive regions throughout the Eastern European borderlands. To 
achieve a comparable data base, the questionnaire was identical across countries.
10 
In the survey, household heads were asked about socio-demographic and human capital 
characteristics of all family members as well as about the temporary migration experience 
of household members aged 16 and over. Additionally, basic information on household 
and settlement characteristics was collected. Temporary migrants in our sample are per-
sons who have been abroad for work reasons at least once for a minimum of four weeks 
since 2004 but have returned to their country of origin after the last trip.
11 Therefore it has 
to be kept in mind that our definition of migration is restricted to temporary labour migra-
tion and that our results cannot be generalized to other types of movements.
12 We con-
sider temporary return migrants in our survey to be representative for temporary move-
ments in the region. In other words, we are convinced from qualitative interviews that 
migrants had ex-ante planned to migrate only temporarily. Although we acknowledge that 
some migrants might have intended to stay longer, there is no indication that our sample 
consists of “failed permanent migrants”. This is supported by the fact that 96% of tempo-
rary migrants in our survey planned to take part in temporary labour movements again 
(see Table 7). To the contrast, only 43% of respondents who had no temporary labour 
migration experience were willing to go abroad for temporary work in the near future.  
                                                
The survey provides us with detailed demographic, human capital, family related and 
settlement information on 6,082 individuals older than 17 years living in 2,003 house-
holds in Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine (see Table 3). Approxi-
mately 9% of all households contained a temporary work migrant. While some indi-
 
8 For a detailed project description see Wallace and Vincent (2007). 
9 In Ukraine, one region in the more russified Eastern part and one in the Western part were chosen. 
10 Starting from an English version the questionnaire was tanslated into the respective national languages. 
11 The definition of temporary migrants in our survey (stay abroad for at least one month, with the length 
of stay not determined) differs slightly from the UN definition of short-term labour migration. According 
to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, a short-term migrant is defined as a 
person who moves beyond the borders of his or her country of usual residence for a period of at least 3 
months but less than a year (12 months) except in cases where the move is for purposes of recreation, 
holiday, visits to friends and relatives, business trips, medical treatment or religious pilgrimage (UN 
1998: 18). 
12 It has to be remarked that only household heads responded to the question on future migration. 
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viduals experienced multiple migration spells (1.45 on average among all migrants), 
some households hosted more than one temporary migrant. In comparing migrants and 
non-migrants we find females, younger people (17-25 years old) and members of the 
age cohort between 56 and 65 years less engaged in moving abroad as compared to 
males and persons between 26 and 55 years (see Table 4). Not unusual for post Soviet 
societies, the level of human capital of surveyed persons is generally rather high, al-
though educational attainment differs between migrants and non migrants. People hold-
ing university degrees are less likely to participate in migration, while those with sec-
ondary and lower education had more often left the country for temporary work. 
In an effort to grasp general human capital and personal orientation towards Western 
societies we introduce two dummy variables: one mapping English language skills and 
another identifying people with no foreign language skills. In this study, English lan-
guage competence is interpreted as having an orientation towards the European Union 
or Western societies, while no foreign language skills are considered to relate to lower 
human capital endowment.
13 According to our survey, migrants have lower rates of 
English language knowledge than non migrants but also are less likely to lack any for-
eign language competence.
14 We infer from these language patterns that migrants are 
well-endowed with human capital while English language knowledge appears to be an 
asset of the younger population. It is an outstanding feature of temporary migration 
from Eastern Europe that younger cohorts are under represented among migrants.  
Furthermore we are interested in the ethnic background of respondents to be able to 
control for ethnic motivations in temporary movements. In the survey we found per-
sons, belonging to the titular nationality—i.e. being a member of the ethnic group that 
comprises the eponymous majority of the nation state—more engaged in temporary 
migration than ethnic minorities. This indicates that work related migration is on aver-
age hardly supported by ethnic motivations. 
The survey identified various family characteristics, such as household size, small 
children (younger than five years) and elderly (older than 60 years, but not active in the 
labour market) living in the household. These variables are assumed to capture factors 
that influence temporary movements in the family context. In our sample we find 
smaller households more likely to send a family member abroad, while families with 
small children and elderly household members were less engaged in temporary migra-
tion. In terms of settlement structure the sample allows distinguishing between persons 
living in rural and urban areas, and among the latter people who inhabit a regional cen-
tre can be identified by a dummy variable. According to the survey data, migrants were 
more frequently than non-migrants found in rural parts of sending countries, while they 
were much less prevalent in regional centres. In all countries under consideration, 
Moldova features as a high emigration region, while temporary migration movements 
are quantitatively of little importance in Georgia. 
                                                 
13 Despite using educational attainment as a general indicator for human capital, we additionally exploit 
information on language knowledge as educational degrees from the Soviet Union might not adequately 
reflect the current potential for income generation. 
14 Bilingualism (e.g. Russian and Ukrainian) was not considered as foreign language. 
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5 Descriptive analysis of migration patterns across countries 
In the following, we analyse characteristics of temporary migrants and their destination 
choice in a cross-country comparison (see Table 5). As has already been noted, 
Moldova defines a region of high temporary migration incidence (19.8%), followed by 
Armenia (10%), Belarus (6.5%), Ukraine (6.5%) and—lagging far behind—Georgia 
(3%). In the case of Moldova, the intense participation of this country in international 
(irregular) temporary labour migration has widely been documented (CBS AXA 2005, 
Cuc et al. 2005, Görlich and Trebesch 2008). The considerable, however smaller, in-
volvement of Armenian and Ukrainian families in labour movements was recently also 
acknowledged (Yeganyan 2006, Danzer and Handrich 2007, Dietz 2007). To the con-
trast, the comparatively high temporary migration flows in Belarus come as a surprise. 
Unobserved by migration research, temporary migration has developed in Belarus, chal-
lenging its seemingly closed character. 
Whereas temporary migration from Armenia is predominantly male, the female mi-
gration share is considerable in Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia. A study done 
by Minasyan and Hancilova (2005) which found a similar high proportion of men in 
Armenian labour migration suggests, that traditional cultural norms and social patterns 
are foremost responsible for this gender bias. The high demand for male migrants in 
construction and agriculture in Russia is an additional argument to explain the high 
share of Armenian men in recent temporary movements.
15 As similar traditional gender 
patterns could be expected for Georgia, the comparatively high female share in latest 
temporary migration is puzzling. Most likely this is a result of recent movements to-
wards European Union destinations (Badurashvili 2004). The demand for household 
services and care jobs in Western countries seems to increasingly channel women from 
Georgia into temporary labour migration. 
Younger age cohorts (17-35 years of age) dominated temporary movements from 
Moldova, Belarus and Georgia, whereas the age group of persons between 36 and 65 
prevailed in Armenia and Ukraine. Educational attainment of migrants was highest in 
Georgia and lowest in Armenia, mirroring the skill requirements of destination regions. 
While temporary labour migrants from CIS countries generally work in low skilled oc-
cupations abroad, travelling to and working in Western countries certainly demand 
higher skills and ambitions. Self-reported English language competence was especially 
high in Belarus and Georgia, pointing to a stronger Western orientation of temporary 
migrants there. 
In looking at household characteristics, migrant families were rather big in Armenia 
(5.2 persons), while being comparatively small in Ukraine (3.6 persons) and Belarus 
(3.5 persons). Between 10% and 15% of migrant households had to care for pre-school 
aged children, with Armenian and Moldovan families being found at the upper bound. 
The share of families living with elderly persons fluctuated between 40% in the case of 
Armenia and 9.3% in the case of Belarus and Moldova. In all countries but Moldova, 
migration was less prevalent in rural areas. A high participation of Moldovans from the 
                                                 
15 It should be noted that migrants to Russia traditionally work in ethnically clustered occupations. 
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country side was also found by Moshneaga (2006), who argued that the less dynamic, 
predominantly rural part of the Moldovan labour force was engaged in recent work mi-
gration to Russia. Throughout the observation region, migration was not dominated by 
ethnic minorities. Repeated migration existed in all countries under consideration, with 
Armenia and Moldova having the highest share of circular migrants. Furthermore, the 
involvement of more than one household member in recent labour movements was 
common across the region, particularly in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. 
Russia and other CIS states attracted the largest share of migrants from all countries 
under observation, except for Georgia (see Table 6 and Figure 2). According to our sur-
vey, nearly all temporary migrants from Armenia either moved to Russia (80.5%) or to 
other CIS countries (15.2%). This is very close to the results of a recent household sur-
vey conducted in Armenia which found 90% of (short term) labour migrants having left 
for Russia and CIS countries in the period between 2002 and 2005 (Minasyan and Han-
cilova 2005). With respect to migration destinations, Georgia is an exception in sending 
only 11% of temporary labour migrants to Russia. This reflects the severe political con-
flicts between Georgia and Russia which also found an expression in hostile attitudes 
towards Georgian labour migrants in the Russian Federation. In all countries under ob-
servation—with the exception of Armenia—migration was divided between Eastern and 
Western destinations. Belarus, Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine sent between 23% and 
40% of their temporary migrants to European Union destinations. In Ukraine the choice 
of destinations depended heavily on the regional background. Migrants from the West-
ern part of Ukraine predominantly addressed European Union countries, those from 
Eastern regions mostly went to Russia. 
Concerning the economic welfare of surveyed households, respondents were asked 
to evaluate their situation according to four categories, namely food poor (families 
could not afford basic food and consumption goods), constrained (families had enough 
money only for food and basic consumption goods), satisfactory (families could afford a 
satisfactory living standard) and good (families had no financial problems). Of those 
four categories we define two groups of deprived households, namely food poor house-
holds and economically constrained households, which comprise the lowest two welfare 
categories. According to our survey results, migrants’ households were slightly more 
often food poor as compared to non-migrants’ households, while they were less often 
financially constrained (see Table 8). A country comparison revealed that migrant send-
ing households in Armenia and Georgia were more often food poor and economically 
constrained than households with no migrants, while in Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine 
non-migrant households were generally worse off. This finding suggests that the coun-
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6 Estimation of migration determinants 
Subsequently we analyse the effects of socio-demographic, human capital, family and 
settlement variables on the propensity of temporary labour movements in a multivariate 
setting. We use a simple probit model of the following reduced form to estimate the 
migration determinants of individual i: 
   i i i i C X p ε γ β + + = = ) 1 Pr(    (1) 
The outcome variable is assumed to be normally distributed and the error term is or-
thogonal to the explanatory variables X including human capital and household charac-
teristics as well as country and settlement controls C. The variables used in our multi-
variate estimation analysis have been presented and described in previous parts of this 
study (see Tables 3, 4 and 5). 
The binary dependent variable indicates whether a person has been temporary abroad 
for at least one month since 2004. Independent variables comprise demographic infor-
mation such as gender and age. Education is included as a proxy for general human 
capital. We create three educational categories and include university degree and sec-
ondary education into the regressions. The category lower education is being omitted 
from the regressions as base category. An orientation towards Western societies is in-
troduced in the form of English language skills, while no foreign language competence 
describes comparatively low human capital endowment. To account for household spe-
cific conditions which might prevent or hamper migration we include the household 
size and dummy variables for the presence of small children and elder family members. 
The other variables used in our estimations are controls for settlement type, ethnic af-
filiation and country fixed effects. Furthermore we want to explore if determinants of 
migration differ between men and women. The underlying assumption in the pooled full 
sample regression implied gender to be a shift parameter, while the split into gender sub-
samples allows for qualitative differences in determinants of migration decisions. The 
presence of children and dependents, for instance, is expected to impact differently on the 
migration decisions of males and females. Besides estimating general determinants of 
temporary labour migration in the regression pooled over countries, we want to account 
for differences in migration determinants between countries under consideration. Spe-
cial attention is paid to the role of unemployment as a determinant for migration. We 
use both, individual and household level regressions to investigate whether unemploy-
ment promotes or hinders migration. 
As the welfare consequences associated with migration are of highest policy rele-
vance, we also investigate whether households with or without past migration experi-
ence are more or less likely to be economically deprived. Again, we use a probit model 
to estimate the determinants of poverty of household j: 
  j j j j j j C X Femhead Migration Migration p ε γ β δ δ + + + + = = 2 1 * ) 1 Pr(    (2) 
We are especially interested in the coefficients δ1 and δ2 which report the association 
between past temporary labour migration (in the latter case interacted with a dummy 
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indicating whether a household is female-headed) and current poverty status. As the 
decision to send a migrant abroad might be endogenous to unobserved previous levels 
of welfare, we test the direction of the resulting bias in the naive probit estimates by 
exploiting the retrospective nature of the INTAS data. If better-off households were 
generally more likely to send migrants, the poverty reducing effect of migration might 
simply reflect downward biased estimates. More specifically, we instrument the deci-
sion to send a migrant in 2005 with the probability of migration experience in 2004 in a 
highly significant linear first stage regression (F-value 32.5). From this we estimate a 
Two-stage-least-square estimator which should correct the downward bias of probit. 
Furthermore, we use the regional migration density of the year 2004 to control for gen-
eral differences in welfare levels associated with migration. 
 
 
6.1 Multivariate regression results 
In the following section, we provide results for the multivariate regressions of migration 
determinants. Table 9 presents marginal effects of three regressions, estimating the de-
terminants of migration for the full sample and for males and females separately. All 
regressions have a reasonable fit. The baseline regression shows that being a woman 
significantly discourages migration. The propensity to move increases with age, how-
ever, at a declining rate. The latter result indicates that people in the beginning and in 
the end of their working life are less engaged in moving abroad. Although the general 
result is broadly in line with human capital considerations and empirical findings in 
other parts of the world (Stark and Taylor 1991, Mora and Taylor 2005), the back 
loaded nature of the age-profile of migrants is surprising, especially in Armenia, 
Ukraine and Moldova (Figure 3). According to our estimations a university degree sig-
nificantly lowers the propensity to migrate, while secondary education has no signifi-
cant effect. This contrasts a number of studies which pointed to a positive correlation 
between education and migration (Adams 2003). However, in the context of temporary 
migration in former Soviet Union countries, we expect a mechanism at work similar to 
the case of migrations from Mexico to the USA (Mora and Taylor 2005: 47). Because a 
high percentage of migrants are irregular and predominantly employed in low-skilled 
occupations, returns to schooling obtained in the home country are negligible. This 
should be particularly true for Western destinations where educational attainments ob-
tained in CIS states do in general not pay off. For the full sample, English language 
skills have no significant effect on temporary migrations while having no foreign lan-
guage skills strongly discourages movements. In line with these results we conclude 
that migrants might not be particularly drawn to Western countries but nevertheless 
belong to the part of the population with better human capital endowment. As house-
hold size has a significantly negative effect on moving abroad, higher family obliga-
tions might prevent migration. However, small kids in the household have no influence 
on migration probabilities. This fact may be explained by the temporary character of 
movements in our study which allows keeping up family bonds while earning money 
abroad. Improved forms of long distance travel and communication facilities may addi-
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tionally ease migration in the presence of small children at home. Elderly household 
members were found to significantly strengthen the likelihood to move. They seem to 
play a supportive role in caring for children and in performing household duties while 
younger (and often female) household members are away for work. 
When restricting the sample to male vs. female respondents, it becomes clear, that 
determinants of migration differ across gender. Age and age squared have a stronger 
and more significant effect on men, indicating that very young and older men are less 
likely to migrate as compared to their female counterparts. We explain this pattern by 
the demand structure for labour migrants abroad: While men mostly work in construc-
tion or agriculture, i.e. heavy labour, the highest demand for women is in home caring 
and nursing which can be performed almost without age restrictions (Ehrenreich and 
Hochschild 2002). Being a university graduate discourages men from migration, while 
education does not play a significant role for female migrants. This is explained by bet-
ter chances of highly educated men to find employment according to their skills at 
home. It is interesting to note that women with English language skills are significantly 
less likely to engage in migration, while this factor is irrelevant for men. Nevertheless, 
having no foreign language skills discourages men and women strongly from moving 
abroad. As expected, the presence of small children has a discouraging effect for 
women, but not for men. Likewise, elderly family members in the household only en-
courage women to leave, thus emphasizing the supportive role of older household 
members with respect to family obligations. 
In a next step we explore if determinants of migration differ between sending re-
gions, using separate regressions for countries under consideration (Table 10). As ex-
pected, the regressions exhibit lower fits due to smaller sample sizes. While females 
were strongly discouraged from migration in Armenia, Belarus and Moldova, no sig-
nificant gender effect on migration could be found in Georgia and Ukraine. As has al-
ready been discussed earlier, the demand structure in destination regions might be re-
sponsible for that pattern. Although the inverse U-shaped age-migration nexus could be 
observed in all countries under observation, it is not significant in the case of Georgia 
and Belarus. In both countries, younger age cohorts were likewise drawn into migration 
movements. With respect to educational attainment, a university education significantly 
promotes temporary movements in Georgia while it discourages them in Moldova. This 
pattern is likewise reflected in looking at English language skills which had a signifi-
cantly positive sign in the case of Georgia and a negative in Moldova. Furthermore it 
has to be remarked that lacking foreign language skills discouraged people from migra-
tion across all countries under consideration, although this variable was only significant 
in the case of Moldova and Ukraine. 
In Belarus and Ukraine household size significantly lowered migration probabilities 
pointing to the discouraging effect on migrations of big households in these countries. 
Small children prevented temporary movements only in Armenia where traditional fam-
ily structures are particularly strong. The supportive effect of elderly family members 
was exclusively significant in the case of Moldova, confirming the immense relevance 
of aiding family members in this country with extremely high migration intensity. 
While in Ukraine, people living in rural areas were less likely to be drawn into tempo-
rary movements, the migration participation of rural inhabitants was significantly higher 
  14 Temporary Labour Migration and Welfare at the New European Fringe 
in Belarus. We expect economic performance in the respective regions to explain this 
pattern. 
Individual unemployment is a strong determinant for migration in Belarus (+14.5%) 
and Ukraine (+6.8%), while the results for Armenia and Georgia suggest that unem-
ployment may render migration impossible in generally poorer countries (Table 11). On 
the household level, we see the robust finding across countries, that unemployment (of 
at least one household member) increases the propensity to move strongly. Only in 
Georgia the effect is negative. Overall, these results suggest that albeit households re-
spond to unemployment with sending a migrant abroad, they might send the most prom-
ising household member rather than the unemployed individual. 
The results of our estimations are robust with respect to variable selection and model 
extensions.
16 Initially we proved this by repeating the baseline and the male versus fe-
male regressions using regionally clustered standard errors finding very similar results. 
In a further test we included the variable regional centre, and titular nationality identi-
fying the ethnic background of individuals. Living in a regional centre negatively influ-
enced migration intentions only in the case of men, probably referring to better labour 
market chances for males in a more urban setting. Including titular nationality in the 
baseline model showed that nationals were more likely to temporarily move abroad, 
although this result was only significant in the baseline model and for the male sample. 
Otherwise, the coefficients of original regressions were not affected. Furthermore, we 
tested whether relaxing the sample age restriction, i.e. including adults above 65 years, 
would change the country related estimations which was not the case. Also, the educa-
tional variable was replaced by years of schooling which had only a marginal effect in 
the case of Georgia, where years of schooling turned insignificant, although university 
and secondary education had significantly encouraged migration in the original estima-
tion.  
Our poverty estimation suggests that migrants’ households are 4.9% less likely to be 
economically constrained compared to non-migrants’ households but neither more nor 
less likely to be food poor, i.e. unable to afford the required minimum food consump-
tion (Table 12). Other poverty correlates show the expected signs with female-headed 
households and larger households being more likely to be economically constrained as 
well as households from rural and regional centre settlement being less likely to be eco-
nomically constrained.
17 When introducing the interaction between migration incidence 
and female-headedness of the household, the negative association between deprivation 
status and past migration becomes even larger (-6.7%). Interestingly, after inclusion of 
the interaction term, migrant households are also 2.7% less likely to be food poor, while 
female-headed migrant households are 4.4% more likely to be food poor. However, one 
general caveat in the analysis of the poverty-migration nexus is the question of reverse 
causation. Potentially, less deprived households were simply better able to finance the 
migration of a household member. To test the direction of the potential bias in our esti-
                                                 
16 Results are not reported but available from the authors upon request. 
17 The lower deprivation rates among rural households can be explained by the widespread phenomenon 
of subsidiary farming activities. 
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mates, we first compare households with different migration experiences. As becomes 
clear form Table 13, households which had a migrant neither in 2004 nor in 2005 were 
quite similar to households which had a migrant in both years with respect to poverty. 
Unlike those, households which had a migrant only in one of the two years were signifi-
cantly less likely to be economically constrained at the time of the survey. Furthermore 
the analysis shows that past migration experience of a household was a good predictor 
for migration in early 2006. Although being no perfect test of causation, this result sug-
gests that economically constrained households could afford to send migrants. In Table 
14 we extend this analysis and focus on the conditional impact of migration in 2004 on 
current poverty level when controlling for general welfare shifts between regions of 
different migration intensity (in early 2004, before the EU enlargement). We not only 
find that migration intense regions have generally lower poverty rates (by 1.3 percent-
age points) but also that household level migration is still negatively associated with 
poverty. As column 2 shows, the long term poverty reducing effect was only significant 
for households headed by a woman. In the next step we instrument household migration 
in the year 2005 with migration propensity in 2004. If the naive probit estimates were 
biased, we would expect the coefficient to move closer to zero. However, we observe 
the opposite. Although this instrumentation does not suggest clear causality, it points to 
the fact that the negative coefficient on migration is not merely driven by welfare gains 
previous to the recent migration spells.  
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7 Summary and Policy Implications 
This paper explored temporary migration movements and their determinants in five for-
mer Soviet Union countries—Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine—after 
the enlargement of the European Union in 2004. Across sending countries, temporary 
migration incidence differed considerably. While Moldova faced a high temporary la-
bour emigration since 2004, Armenia, Belarus and Ukraine were confronted with a 
more moderate outflow. To the contrast, temporary labour movements from Georgia 
were quite low. With respect to destination regions, Russia and other CIS countries at-
tracted the majority of temporary migrants in the case of Armenia, Belarus, Moldova 
and Ukraine, while Georgian labour migrants headed predominantly for European and 
overseas destinations. 
Among the most important determinants to migrate we found individual demo-
graphic characteristics and household composition. These determinants did not gener-
ally differ from what is observed in other parts of the world. However, we identified 
some peculiarities such as a relatively back loaded inverse U-shaped age-migration 
nexus, a negative impact of university education and a rather low influence of family 
obligations on migration decisions. Individual unemployment is a strong determinant 
for migration only in Belarus and Ukraine while unemployment on the household level 
generally increases the propensity to send a migrant. Thus, albeit households respond to 
unemployment with sending a migrant abroad, they might send the most promising 
household member rather than the unemployed individual. 
The analysis showed that past migration is associated with significantly lower cur-
rent household deprivation as long as the household was not female-headed. Simple 
comparisons of deprivation across households with repeated migration spells suggest 
that migration indeed reduces poverty. This finding is supported by a two-stage IV es-
timation which finds no systematic downward bias in the migration impact on poverty.  
Several policy implications can be drawn from our analysis, both for the countries of 
origin and the countries of destination. Fears of brain drain have not been substantiated 
in our analysis on temporary labour migration, although the results may differ in the 
case of permanent movements. A major drawback for migrant sending countries lies in 
the potential for social problems in families. As noted above, the presence of small chil-
dren does not prevent from migration. Although elderly household members support 
temporary migrants in caring for kids and other duties at home, social policy has to be 
aware of the detrimental social effects, potentially resulting from temporary labour 
movements. In Moldova and Ukraine increasing numbers of social orphans have been 
observed in recent years, as their parents went abroad for work.
18 However, migration is 
associated with lower poverty incidence among households. So far it remains unclear, 
whether migration causally reduces poverty or whether better-off households are simply 
more likely to afford migration. Future research should focus on this issue as the direc-
tion of causality will determine whether migration causes increasing or decreasing ine-
quality within societies. 
                                                 
18 We thank Natalia Astapova from the UNICEF office Kiev for this information. 
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As concerns the countries of destination we restrict ourselves to two major implica-
tions for the European Union which are of high importance in the political debate. De-
spite focussing on short term migration only, we want to stress that the majority of tem-
porary labour migrants from the Eastern borderlands was directed towards Russia and 
other CIS countries. However, there is also a remarkable part of migrants addressing 
European Union countries. European Union politicians should be aware that the demand 
for immigrants in low skilled professions is increasingly satisfied by Eastern Europeans, 
temporarily moving to European Union countries. As many of them currently work on 
an irregular basis, effective migration regulation schemes should be considered. Second, 
the educational background of migrants from Eastern European countries to the EU is 
rather low. Albeit the EU increasingly intends to attract highly qualified workers, the 
supply of a highly skilled work force from Eastern Europe in the framework of tempo-
rary migration seems unrealistic in the near future. 
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Appendix 
Figure 1:   Net migration, Armenia, Georgia, Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine 
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Source: Transmonee Database, 2008 
 
 
Table 1:   GDP per capita (PPP, 2005 constant US $), Armenia, Belarus, Georgia,  
  Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, various European Union countries 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Germany  29,582 29,904 29,840 29,772 30,153 30,444 31,323 
Italy  27,591 28,070 28,079 27,872 27,931 27,749 28,155 
Portugal  17,095 17,751 18,523 19,167 19,952 19,956 20,141 
Czech Rep.  16,773  17,267  17,635 18,268 19,094  20.280  21,435 
Poland  11,540 11,741 11,917 12,389 13,056 13,534  14.378 
Armenia  2,289 2,523 2,869 3,285 3,642 4,161 4,728 
Belarus  5,810 6,105 6,443 6,932 7,765 8,540 9,431 
Georgia  2,341 2,481 2,648 2,974 3,180 3,520 3,886 
Moldova  1,455 1,565 1,710 1,848 2,012 2,190 2,303 
Ukraine  3,689 4,069 4,324 4,777 5,396 5,583 6,020 
Russia  8,613 9,073 9,546  10,297 11,090 11,858 12,710 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 08 
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Table 2:  Human development index (HDI)*, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova,  
  Ukraine, Russia, various European Union countries 
  HDI Rank  Human development index 2005 
Spain 13  0.949 
Italy 20  0.942 
Germany 27  0.935 
Portugal 29  0.897 
Czech Rep.  32  0.891 
Poland 37  0.870 
Belarus 64  0.804 
Russia 67  0.802 
Ukraine 76  0.788 
Armenia 83  0.775 
Georgia 96  0.754 
Moldova 111  0.708 
*The HDI is a summary composite index that measures a country’s average achievements in health, knowledge and a decent stan-
dard of living. Health is measured by life expectancy at birth; knowledge by a combination of the adult literacy rate and the combi-
ned primary, secondary, and tertiary gross enrolment ration; and standard of living by GDP per capita (PPP US$). 
Source: United Nations, Human Development Report 2007/2008 
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Table 3:   INTAS data set, variable overview 
Variable name  Observations Mean  Min  Max 
Female 6082  0.518  0  1 
Age 17-25  6082  0.276  0  1 
Age 26-35  6082  0.206  0  1 
Age 36-55  6082  0.446  0  1 
Age 56+  6082  0.067  0  1 
University education  6082  0.292  0  1 
Secondary education  6082  0.646  0  1 
Lower education  6082  0.062  0  1 
English 6082  0.194  0  1 
No foreign language  6082  0.581  0  1 
Household size  6082  4.283  1  10 
Children (0-5 yrs)  6082  0.153  0  1 
Elderly in the household  6082  0.244  0  1 
Rural 6082  0.310  0  1 
Regional centre  6082  0.222  0  1 
Titular nationality  6082  0.921  0  1 
Unemployed 6082  0.157  0  1 
Armenia 6082  0.212  0  1 
Belarus 6082  0.190  0  1 
Georgia 6082  0.214  0  1 
Moldova 6082  0.197  0  1 
Ukraine 6082  0.187  0  1 
Temporary migration  6082  0.091  0  1 
Migration 2004  6082  0.041  0  1 
Migration 2005  6082  0.051  0  1 
Number of stays abroad  6082  0.145  0  4 
Number of migrants in household  6082  0.301  0  5 
Source: INTAS; authors’ calculations. 
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Table 4:   Profiles of migrants and non-migrants 
  Migrants Non-migrants  Full  sample 
Female  36.2% 53.4% 51.8% 
Age 17-25  25.5% 27.8% 27.6% 
Age 26-35  27.2% 19.9% 20.6% 
Age 36-55  44.4% 44.6% 44.6% 
Age 56+  2.9% 7.1% 6.7% 
University education  18.5% 30.3% 29.2% 
Secondary education  72.1% 63.8% 64.6% 
Lower education  9.4% 5.9% 6.2% 
English  17.3% 19.6% 19.4% 
No foreign language  54.0% 58.5% 58.1% 
Household size  4.19 4.29 4.28 
Children (0-5 yrs)  14.2% 15.4% 15.3% 
Elderly in the household  19.8% 24.9% 24.4% 
Rural  40.1% 30.1% 31.0% 
Regional center  13.3% 23.1% 22.2% 
Titular nationality  94.4% 91.8% 92.1% 
Observations  556 5526  6082 
Source: INTAS; authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 5:   Migrants profiles, by country of origin 
 Armenia  Belarus  Georgia  Moldova  Ukraine 
Female 9.2% 38.7% 48.7%  45.1%  45.3%
Age 17-25  26.9% 45.3% 41.0%  19.8%  13.3%
Age 26-35  20.0% 28.0% 23.1%  31.6%  26.7%
Age 36-55  46.9% 25.3% 33.3%  47.7%  54.7%
Age 56+  6.2% 1.3% 2.6%  0.8%  5.3%
University education  13.8% 28.0% 46.2%  11.8%  24.0%
Secondary education  83.1% 70.7% 53.8% 69.2% 73.3%
Lower education  3.1% 1.3% 0.0%  19.0%  2.7%
English 3.1% 49.3% 53.8%  8.0%  20.0%
No foreign language  91.4% 38.6% 20.5% 51.9% 29.3%
Household size  5.18 3.51 4.21  4.04  3.65
Children (0-5 yrs)  15.4% 10.7% 10.3%  15.6%  13.3%
Elderly in the household  40.0% 9.3% 30.8%  9.3%  22.7%
Rural 15.6% 29.3% 33.3%  62.4%  22.6%
Regional center  0.0% 42.7% 43.6%  10.5%  25.3%
Titular nationality  98.4% 88.0% 100.0%  94.1%  92.0%
Number of stays  1.28 1.04 1.10  1.26  1.03
Number of migrants in household  1.26 1.19 1.44  1.57  1.40
Observations 130 75 39  237  75
Source: INTAS; authors’ calculations. 
  25OSTEUROPA-INSTITUT REGENSBURG, Working Paper Nr.273 
Table 6:   Migration patterns, by country of origin 
 Armenia  Belarus  Georgia  Moldova  Ukraine  Total 
Migration  10.07% 6.50%  3.00% 19.80% 6.58%  9.14% 
Destination Europe  2.78%  23.08% 30.43% 32.28% 39.83% 25.92% 
Destination Russia  80.56%  27.35% 10.87% 44.91% 21.19% 43.10% 
Destination CIS  15.28%  40.17% 28.26% 20.70% 35.59% 25.77% 
Destination Overseas  1.39%  9.40% 30.43% 2.11%  3.39%  5.21% 
  100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Migration Incidence 2004  4.96%  2.95% 0.69% 9.36% 2.72% 4.11% 
Migration Incidence 2005  4.42%  3.38% 1.77%  12.03%  4.21% 5.11% 
Year-to-year change  -10.94%  14.71%  155.56%  28.57% 54.84% 24.40% 
Percentage women migrants  9.23%  38.67% 48.72% 45.15% 45.33% 36.15% 
Observations  1291 1153 1302 1197 1139 6082 























Source: INTAS; authors’ calculations 
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Table 7:   Prevalence of future migration plans by migration experience 
  With migration experience  Without migration experience 
Armenia 92.3%  34.9% 
Belarus 100.0%  39.8% 
Georgia 85.7%  46.7% 
Moldova 98.1% 56.9% 
Ukraine 93.6%  38.5% 
    
Age 17 - 25  93.8%  60.4% 
Age 26 - 35  97.4%  48.9% 
Age 36 - 55  97.3%  34.1% 
Age 56+  100.0%  20.0% 
    
Total 96.3%  43.2% 
Observations 162  1841 
Source: INTAS; authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Table 8:   Poverty status in households with and withoutmigrants 
  
 
Non- migrants  Migrants Total 
Armenia Constrained  81.3%  82.6%  81.4% 
 Food  poor 26.5%  27.1%  26.5% 
        
Belarus Constrained  38.9%  27.4%  38.3% 
 Food  poor  0.7%  0.0%  0.7% 
        
Georgia Constrained  75.4%  77.4%  75.4% 
 Food  poor 10.7%  12.5%  10.7% 
        
Moldova Constrained  71.8%  66.7%  70.8% 
 Food  poor 17.5%  14.5%  17.0% 
        
Ukraine Constrained  54.4%  42.6%  53.7% 
 Food  poor  5.7%  5.7%  5.7% 
        
Total Constrained  66.8%  64.7%  66.7% 
 Food  poor 13.4%  15.3%  13.5% 
Note: „constrained“ refers to economically constrained and food poor households; „food poor“ means that households cannot meet 
basic nutritional requirements. 
Source: INTAS; authors’ calculations. 
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Note: Mean actual migration shares are calculated for 5-year age brackets starting at age of 15. The scale for Moldova differs from 
other countries’ scales. 
Source: INTAS; authors’ calculations. 
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Table 9: Probit Regressions of determinants of migration, full sample; adults 16-65 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Baseline  model  Men  Women 
Female -0.055     
 (8.51)***     
Age  0.014 0.023 0.005 
  (7.22)*** (7.32)*** (2.78)*** 
Age  squared  -0.019 -0.030 -0.008 
  (7.29)*** (7.15)*** (3.12)*** 
University  education  -0.036 -0.069 -0.013 
  (2.72)*** (3.34)*** (0.90) 
Secondary  education  -0.001 -0.003 -0.005 
  (0.12) (0.15) (0.38) 
English language knowledge -0.005  0.011  -0.014 
  (0.54) (0.55) (1.65)* 
No language knowledge  -0.058  -0.038  -0.066 
  (6.87)*** (2.66)*** (7.31)*** 
Household  size  -0.007 -0.003 -0.011 
 (2.24)**  (0.52)  (3.15)*** 
Children  (0-5)  -0.013 -0.004 -0.020 
  (1.43) (0.30) (2.21)** 
Elderly in the household  0.018  0.011  0.020 
 (2.00)**  (0.74)  (1.98)** 
Rural  settlement  0.001 0.004 -0.003 
  (0.10) (0.36) (0.37) 
Belarus  0.004 0.020 -0.009 
  (0.37) (1.00) (0.93) 
Moldova  0.132 0.148 0.098 
  (9.47)*** (6.57)*** (6.73)*** 
Georgia  -0.039 -0.043 -0.029 
 (3.47)***  (2.15)**  (2.94)*** 
Armenia  0.062 0.139 -0.018 
  (4.94)*** (6.40)*** (1.57) 
Observations  6082 2932 3150 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.11 0.11 0.16 
Note: omitted categories are “Lower education”, “Urban settlement” and “Ukraine” 
Robust z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: INTAS; authors’ calculations. 
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Table 10: Probit Regressions of determinants of migration by countries; adults 16-65 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Armenia Belarus  Georgia Moldova Ukraine 
Female -0.152  -0.039  -0.007 -0.059 -0.014 
  (8.82)*** (3.37)*** (0.98)  (2.64)*** (1.11) 
Age  0.007 0.005 0.002 0.051 0.013 
  (2.25)**  (1.26) (1.01) (7.19)***  (3.77)*** 
Age  squared  -0.009 -0.011 -0.003 -0.069 -0.017 
 (2.25)**  (1.78)*  (1.19)  (7.05)***  (3.73)*** 
University  education  0.019 0.071 0.524 -0.132  -0.026 
  (0.49) (1.19) (5.51)***  (3.86)***  (0.70) 
Secondary education  0.037 0.059 0.603 -0.049  -0.003 
  (1.27) (1.48) (6.66)***  (1.59) (0.09) 
-0.036  0.018 0.027 -0.084  -0.013  English language 
knowledge  (1.12) (0.85) (2.05)**  (2.31)**  (0.76) 
0.015  -0.015 -0.005 -0.222 -0.073  No foreign language 
knowledge  (0.60) (0.82) (0.49) (7.42)***  (4.80)*** 
Household  size  0.004  -0.018 -0.005 -0.011 -0.017 
  (0.77) (1.96)**  (1.30) (0.88) (2.70)*** 
-0.031 -0.008 -0.003 -0.002 -0.013  Children (0-5) 
(2.14)**  (0.48) (0.25) (0.06) (0.76) 
0.019 0.027 -0.001  0.110 0.006  Elderly in the house-
hold  (1.34) (1.12) (0.14) (2.32)**  (0.39) 
Rural  settlement  -0.014  0.030 0.012 -0.003  -0.022 
  (0.86) (1.96)*  (1.33) (0.13) (1.65)* 
Observations  1291 1153 1302 1197 1139 
Pseudo R-squared  0.16 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.09 
Note: omitted categories are “Lower education” and “Urban settlement” 
Robust z statistics in parentheses          
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%           
Source: INTAS; authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Table 11:   The impact of unemployment on the propensity to migrate 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 

















Individual level regression 
Individual unemployment 












Household level regression 
Unemployment within household 
(0.006) (0.026) (0.002) (0.017) (0.020) 
       
Note: For a list of controls in the individual regression, see Table 9. For a list of controls in the individual regression, see Table 12. 
Simple sizes for individual regression: Armenia (1291), Belarus (1153), Georgia (1302), Moldova (1197), Ukraine (1139). Repre-
sentatively weighted sample sizes for household regressions: Armenia (1911), Belarus (1424), Georgia (1757), Moldova (1576), 
Ukraine (1495).  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: INTAS; authors’ calculations. 
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Table 12:   Probit Regressions of determinants of poverty, household level;  
  weighted by household size 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Constrained  Constrained - ex-
tended 
Food poor  Food poor - ex-
tended 
Migrant household   -0.049 -0.067 -0.003 -0.027 
  (3.58)*** (3.07)*** (0.37)  (2.26)** 
Female migrant household   0.027   0.044 
   (1.04)   (2.56)** 
Household size  0.017 0.017 0.003 0.002 
  (3.60)*** (3.54)*** (0.99)  (0.88) 
Female-headed household  0.034 0.028 -0.010  -0.019 
  (2.96)*** (2.11)**  (1.40)  (2.46)** 
Avg. Household age  0.000 0.000 -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.90) (0.91) (0.50) (0.49) 
Avg. Household schooling  -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 
  (0.76) (0.78) (0.26) (0.36) 
Share of women  -0.040 -0.040 -0.005 -0.006 
  (1.28) (1.30) (0.28) (0.29) 
Share of children  0.011 0.010 -0.002  -0.002 
  (0.21) (0.21) (0.06) (0.08) 
Share of elderly  -0.031 -0.030 0.041  0.043 
  (0.56) (0.54) (1.20) (1.26) 
Rural settlement  -0.029 -0.029 0.007  0.007 
  (2.10)** (2.10)** (0.90)  (0.85) 
Regional centre   -0.127 -0.126 -0.041 -0.041 
  (7.23)*** (7.20)*** (3.93)*** (3.85)*** 
Armenia  0.236 0.235 0.215 0.212 
  (14.68)*** (14.57)*** (15.05)*** (14.87)*** 
Belarus  -0.072 -0.073 -0.091 -0.092 
  (3.71)*** (3.73)*** (6.06)*** (6.08)*** 
Georgia  0.233 0.233 0.069 0.068 
  (13.58)*** (13.56)*** (4.85)***  (4.77)*** 
Moldova  0.186 0.186 0.142 0.142 
  (10.97)*** (10.94)*** (9.81)***  (9.79)*** 
Observations  8149 8149 8149 8149 
Pseudo R-squared  0.09 0.09 0.12 0.12 
Note: omitted categories are “Lower education”, “Urban settlement” and “Ukraine” 
Robust z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%         
Source: INTAS; authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Table 13: Poverty ratios and migration incidence 2006 by past migration experience 
  Outcomes  No migrant  Migrant in 




No migrant  Share of constrained house-
holds 










Migrant in 2004 or 2005  Share of constrained house-
holds 







Migrant in 2004 and 2005  Share of constrained house-
holds 
Migration in 2006 
   64.5% 
 
27.7% 
Note: Analysis on the household level; shaded area shows level of significance for mean comparison tests between row and column 
category; *** indicates mean difference significant at 1% level. 
Source: INTAS; authors’ calculations. 
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Table 14: Probit Regressions of determinants of household poverty; IV estimates 
Dependent variable: Household is constrained  (1)  (2)  (3) 
 OLS  OLS  IV 
Migration 2004  -0.064***  -0.001   
 (0.025)  (0.035)   
 -0.126**   Migration 2004*Female head 
 (0.049)  
   -0.163**  Migration 
(instrumented)     (0.066) 
-0.013** -0.014** -0.014**  Regional migration intensity early 2004 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
0.011 0.011  0.019*  Unemployment within household 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
0.032*** 0.038***  0.024**  Female-headed household 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Household size  0.015***  0.015***  0.015*** 
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
0.000 0.000 0.000  Age of household head 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.002  Education of household head 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
-0.032 -0.031 -0.029  Share of women in household 
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
-0.037 -0.038 -0.022  Share of elderly in household 
(0.052) (0.052) (0.053) 
Rural settlement  0.002  0.003  -0.025** 
 (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.013) 
Regional centre  -0.122***  -0.122***  -0.114*** 
 (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
Armenia 0.223***  0.219***  0.235*** 
 (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.017) 
Belarus -0.077***  -0.077***  -0.086*** 
 (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020) 
Georgia 0.206***  0.203***  0.250*** 
 (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.019) 
Moldova 0.209***  0.209***  0.193*** 
 (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.018) 
Constant 0.542***  0.539***  0.497*** 
 (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.045) 
F-test of first stage  —  —  32.5 
Observations 2003  2003  2003 
R-squared 0.113  0.113  0.106 
Note: Household sample weighted in order to yield representative sample. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: INTAS; authors’ calculations. 